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GET/ENST Bretagne
2, rue de la Châtaigneraie CS 17607
35576 Cesson Sévigné Cedex, France
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Abstract. We study a peer-to-peer backup system, where users offer
some of their storage space to provide service for the others. The eco-
nomic model for such a system is different from the ones applicable to
peer-to-peer file sharing systems, since the storage capacity is a private
good here. We study two mechanisms aimed at incentivizing users to
offer some of their capacity: a price-based scheme (here a revenue-driven
monopoly) and a more classical symmetric scheme (imposing users to
contribute to the service at least as much as use it). We compare the
outcomes of such mechanisms to the socially optimal situation that could
be attained if users were not selfish, and show that depending on user
heterogeneity, a revenue maximizing monopoly can be a worse or a better
(in terms of social welfare) way to manage the system than a symmetric
scheme.
Keywords: Peer-to-peer networks, economics, incentives, pricing.
1 Introduction
With the convergence of fixed and mobile telecommunication systems, all kinds 
of digital documents (e.g. videos and audio files, e-mails) are likely to be accessed 
by different types of devices (mobile phone, personal computer, mp3 player). The 
storing of all those then documents raises several questions: should there be only 
one storing location? If so, what happens in case of a crash? If not, how to update 
documents between several locations? Will it be simple to transfer a document 
from a storing location to a given device?
In this paper, we suggest that those problems be addressed via a distributed 
storing system working in a peer-to-peer (P2P) way: using a P2P network infras-
tructure, a (ciphered) copy of each user’s data is stored into the hard drives of 
other participants in the network. As in peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks, 
each participant is consequently at the same time a service user and a service 
provider. Such a service presents a lot of advantages in terms of reliability (data 
replication within the system provides a protection against failures) and ease of 
access (each user can access his data from any device connected to the network).
A peer-to-peer backup system has already been proposed and studied in
[1], that introduces pStore, a secure distributed backup system based on an
adaptive P2P network. pStore exploits unused personal hard drive space at-
tached to the Internet to provide the distributed redundancy needed for reliable
and effective data backup. Moreover, support for file encryption, versioning, and
secure sharing is provided. Nevertheless, no study on how users would react to
such a system is carried out. This paper intents to investigate that particular
issue.
Indeed, it seems reasonable to us to assume that each user is selfish, i.e. is
only sensitive to the quality of service she experiences, regardless of the effects
of her actions on the other users. The framework of Game Theory [2] is there-
fore particularly well-suited to study that kind of interaction among agents: the
situation is then studied as a non-cooperative game played among users, where
a user strategy is the amount of memory capacity offered to provide service to
the other users and the amount of data she stores into the system. Notice that
as for other peer-to-peer (P2P) applications, a user valuation for the service de-
pends on the “generosity” of the other users: each user benefits from the others’
shared capacity. However, there is no direct incentive to offer one’s own capacity
to the others, and users are then incentivized to free-ride [3], i.e. benefit from
the service without contributing to it: if the sharing efforts do not get some kind
of proof of appreciation, nobody has interest to cooperate and the service can-
not exist. Therefore it is necessary that some incentive mechanisms be properly
designed for the service to actually exist and be valuable for users.
For P2P file sharing systems, there is growing evidence of that need for in-
centives. For instance, one study of the Gnutella file sharing system showed that
almost 70% of the peers only consume resources but do not provide any files [3].
The problem of incentivizing users to contribute in such systems has been the
subject of extensive research [4,5,6,7,8].
On the other hand, the existing literature on P2P backup systems mainly
focuses on security, reliability and technical feasibility issues [9,10], whereas the
incentive aspect received little attention. Notice also that the economic models
developed for P2P file sharing systems do not apply to P2P backup services:
in file sharing systems, when a peer provides some files to the community, she
contributes to the whole system in terms of accessibility. This means that the
resource is not dedicated to a certain number of users, but is offered to all
the rest of the peers, and in that sense the information stored in the P2P network
is a public good. On the contrary, a P2P backup system operates on non-divisible
resources, i.e. a certain disk space belongs to one given user (for the time being)
and no other peer can access it. The storing resource available on the network is
then a private good, and it cannot be managed the same way as a public good
from an economic point of view.
The existing models for P2P backup services focus on solutions that do not
require financial transactions. Therefore the counter payment for a given service
is usually the service in question as well. This approach finally leads to a sym-
metric scheme where every peer should contribute to the system in terms of
service at least as much as she benefits from others [11,12,13].
The incentive part of the scheme proposed in [10] relies on the use of a “pro-
bation” period, during which a peer must prove herself reliable before benefiting
from the system. A very strict policy based on quotas is suggested in [14]: each
peer (identified by her IP address) cannot insert more than a given amount of
data into the system. Likewise, the distributed accounting infrastructure pro-
posed in [15] proceeds by simple exclusion of non-cooperating peers from the
system, that are detected via an audit.
In this paper, we investigate more flexible solutions, that could still provide
peers with incentives to contribute to the system. We focus on the performance
of incentive schemes. We propose to study and compare two types of incentive
mechanisms that have been suggested in the literature in other - but linked
- contexts, like file sharing systems, connection sharing systems, and ad hoc
networks: some of those schemes rely on monetary incentives, and some others
are based on service degradation for users who do not contribute enough to the
service. A particular instance of each type of scheme is considered, and their
effects on the overall social welfare are weighted for the particular context of the
P2P backup service.
The paper is organized as follows. The model we consider for user prefer-
ences is depicted in Section 2, where we also study the maximum reachable
value of social welfare yielded by the service. A strict symmetry-based scheme
is studied in Section 3, and schemes implementing pricing are investigated in
Section 4. The performance of those schemes in terms of social welfare are com-
pared in Section 5. Section 6 presents our conclusions and directions for future
work.
2 Model
In this section we describe the model we consider in this paper. We first intro-
duce utility functions that represent user preferences and the decision variables
that constitute user strategies. Then we consider the “ideal” situation where
users would not behave selfishly and act so as to maximize the total system per-
formance (social welfare). That ideal situation will be used in the next sections
as a reference to study incentive schemes.
Note that in this paper, we say that the amount of storage space that is
necessary to safely store some data in the system equals the size of those data.
This is done without loss of generality: assume that the system introduces a
redundancy factor r to improve the data availability on the system, then this is
equivalent to replacing Csi by C
s
i /r in the user cost functions, or equivalently to
replacing Coi by rC
o
i in the user valuation function (remark that prices have a
different interpretation depending on that choice: they are per unit of physical
capacity in the former case, and per unit of “sufficiently available” capacity -
taking into account the redundancy - in the latter).
2.1 User Utility Function
We provide here a model for user preferences. The user set is denoted by I, and
the perceived utility for a user i ∈ I offering capacity Coi , storing an amount
Csi of data in the system and paying a total charge πi should be a decreasing
function of Coi and an increasing function of C
s
i . We suggest to use a separable
additive function of the utility perceived by a user i, as described in the following
definition.
Definition 1. The utility Ui of a user i ∈ I is of the form
Ui (Coi , C
s
i , πi) = Vi(C
s
i ) − Pi(Coi ) − πi, (1)
where
– Vi(Csi ) is the valuation of user i, i.e. the price she is willing to pay to store an
amount Csi of data in the system. In this paper we will assume that Vi(·) is
positive, continuously differentiable, increasing and concave in its argument,
and that Vi(0) = 0 (no service yields no value).
– Pi(Coi ) is the opportunity cost of user i for offering capacity C
o
i to the system,
i.e. it is the price that she is willing to be paid to devote Coi of her disk space to
provide service. We assume that Pi(·) is positive, continuously differentiable,
increasing and strictly convex, and that Pi(0) = 0 (no contribution brings no
cost).
From the valuation and cost functions, we can be derive (by differentiation and
taking the inverse functions) two other functions.
Definition 2. For a user i ∈ I, we call demand function (resp. supply function)
the function di(·) (resp. si(·)) such that for all p ∈ R+,
di(p) :=
{
(V ′i )
−1 (p) if p ≤ V ′i (0),
0 otherwise.
(2)
si(p) :=
{
(P ′i )
−1 (p) if p < limq→+∞ P ′i (q),
+∞ otherwise, (3)
where f ′ stands for the derivative function of function f .
For a given p ≥ 0, di(p) (resp. si(p)) is the amount of storage capacity that
user i would choose to use from (resp. to offer to) the others if she is charged
(resp. paid) a unit price p for it.
Remark that, as intuitively expected, the demand (resp. supply) function is
nonnegative and decreasing (resp. increasing) in the unit price.
To carry out a deeper analysis in the next sections, we will assume that the
demand functions are of the same form for all users, and only differ through a
multiplicative constant. Likewise, we make the same assumption regarding the
supply functions.
Assumption A (Common form of supply and demand functions)
There exist a nonnegative and nonincreasing “common” demand function d(·),
and a nonnegative and nondecreasing “common” supply function s(·) such that
for all user i ∈ I there are positive real values ai and bi which satisfy
di = ai × d (4)
si = bi × s (5)
Moreover,
– d(0) > 0 and s(0) = 0
– d(·) is strictly decreasing while it takes strictly positive values.
– s(·) is strictly increasing (eventually up to a point after which it is constant).
Notice that the same kind of assumption (i.e. same form of utility functions for
all users) is made in [16] in the framework of a P2P file sharing system, for user
valuation functions.
Some of our results in the next sections are established for linear demand and
supply functions d and v.
Assumption B (Affine demand and supply functions)
– The common demand function d is affine. More precisely, there exists p̄ > 0
such that d(p) = [p̄ − p]+, where for y ∈ R, y+ = max(0, y).
– The common supply function s is linear, i.e. s(p) = p.
Under Assumptions A and B, the demand and supply functions of a user i
express as follows:
di (p) = ai[p̄ − p]+, (6)
si (p) = bip. (7)
This corresponds to quadratic functions for the valuation and cost functions:
Vi(Csi ) =
1
ai
(
− (C
s
i ∧ aip̄)
2
2
+ aip̄ (Csi ∧ aip̄)
)
(8)
Pi(Coi ) =
1
bi
Coi
2
2
, (9)
where ∧ denotes the min. Finally, we will sometimes consider the following
assumption in the case of a large number of users.
Assumption C. Under Assumption A, the values ai (resp. bi) of all users i ∈ I
are independent and identically distributed. Moreover, ai and bi are independent.
2.2 Social Welfare
A user can choose her own strategy by varying her Csi and C
o
i parameters
1. In
this subsection we define social welfare, which will be used later as a performance
measure to compare different incentive schemes.
Definition 3. We call social welfare (or welfare) and denote by W the sum of
the utilities of all agents in the system:
W :=
∑
i
Vi(Csi ) − Pi(Coi ). (10)
Notice that no prices appear in (10). This is because even if we consider a
payment-based incentive scheme, we choose to include in social welfare all system
agents, eventually including the entity that receives (or gives) payments. The
utility of this entity would be its revenue, and all money it exchanges with
the users would stay within the system and therefore does not influence social
welfare.
Let us have a look at the “optimal” situation that the system can attain (in
terms of social welfare maximization). The problem expresses
max
Csi ,C
o
i
(∑
i
Vi(Csi ) − Pi(Coi )
)
, (11)
subject to Coi ≥ 0, Csi ≥ 0 for ∀i, and
∑
i
Coi ≥
∑
i
Csi . (12)
This is a classical convex optimization problem, that can be solved by the
Lagrangian method.
– The first order conditions imply that for all i ∈ I, P ′i (Coi ) = p and V ′i (Csi ) =
p, where p ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier relative to the feasibility constraint
(12).
– The complementary slackness condition writes min [p,
∑
i (C
o
i − Csi )] = 0.
Moreover, p must be strictly positive: otherwise the first order conditions give
Coi = 0 and C
s
i > 0 for all i, violating the feasibility constraint (12). We therefore
obtain
Csi = di (p
∗) , Coi = si (p
∗) , (13)
1 Since staying online induces a disutility for a user without direct counterpart but
improves the quality of the service offered to the others, incentives are needed to
honor peers that are online almost all the time. The definition of such incentives is
ongoing work, and is out of the scope of this paper. We will not consider it here,
assuming that users stay online as much as they can, without trying to minimize the
associated costs.
where p∗ is the (unique) solution of∑
i
si (p∗) − di (p∗) = 0, (14)
and the optimal value of the social welfare is then
W ∗ =
∑
i∈I
Vi(di(p∗)) − Pi(si(p∗)). (15)
Figure 1 (displayed in Section 4) gives a graphical interpretation of the maxi-
mum social welfare that can be attained by the system. Notice that the Lagrange
multiplier can be interpreted as a unit price: if users buy the resource at unit
price p∗, and sell their available disk capacity at the same unit price, then the
selfish user decisions drive the system to the welfare maximizing solution.
The following result considers our particular assumptions.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions A and B, the maximal value W ∗ of social
welfare is
W ∗ =
1
2
p̄2
∑
i ai
∑
i bi∑
i (ai + bi)
. (16)
Proof. From (14), we get the social welfare at the ideally fine-tuned unit price:
p∗ = p̄
∑
i ai∑
i ai + bi
. (17)
Therefore we have Coi = bip
∗ = p̄
bi
∑
j∈I aj∑
j∈I ai+bi
and Csi = p̄
ai
∑
j∈I bj∑
j∈I aj+bj
, which gives,
after some simplifications,
W ∗ =
1
2
p̄2
∑
i ai
∑
i bi∑
i (ai + bi)
, (18)
and establishes the proposition.
We therefore have a characterization of the optimal solution. However, as pointed
out in the introduction, user selfishness does not lead to this optimal situation
when users are not incentivized to offer service to the others. Actually, the unique
Nash equilibrium of the game without incentives corresponds to the situation
where Coi = 0 for all i, and the associated social welfare is 0.
In the rest of the paper, we investigate two kinds of incentive schemes, and
study their performance in terms of social welfare. We first consider mechanisms
without pricing, that simply impose users to provide at least as much memory
space as the amount they intend to use (most of the existing related works
support this kind of fairness providing approach). Then we turn to payment-
based incentive mechanisms where users have to pay for using the service and
are paid if they contribute. We finally compare the outcomes of those schemes in
terms of social welfare, for some particular types of valuation and cost functions.
Since for the two schemes under study the optimal situation cannot be reached
in general, we measure the loss of welfare of those schemes with respect to the
maximum value.
3 Performance of Schemes Imposing Symmetry
In this section, we follow the ideas suggested in the literature for schemes without
pricing. As evoked in the introduction, the principle of those schemes is that
users are invited to contribute to, at least as much as they take from, the others.
Each user i then chooses Coi and C
s
i so as to maximize Vi(C
s
i )− Pi(Coi ), subject
to Coi ≥ Csi . As Pi(·) is increasing in Csi , no user has an interest to choose a
strategy with Coi > C
s
i . Therefore a user will necessarily choose C
o
i = C
s
i . User
i maximizes her utility2 at the point Csi = C
o
i = C
∗
i where
V ′i (C
∗
i ) − P ′i (C∗i ) = 0. (19)
Under our specific assumptions on demand and supply functions, the value of
social welfare for such a scheme can be derived:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions A and B, the ratio of the social welfare for
the symmetric scheme Wsym to the maximum social welfare W ∗ is
Wsym
W ∗
=
(
1∑
i ai
+
1∑
i bi
∑
i
[
1
1
ai
+ 1bi
. (20)
Moreover, under Assumption and C, this ratio converges as the number of
users tends to infinity
Wsym
W ∗
−−−−→
|I|→∞
(
1
E[a]
+
1
E[b]
E
[
1
1
a +
1
b
(21)
Proof. We straightforwardly obtain that for all i, Coi = C
s
i = p̄
aibi
ai+bi
. The cor-
responding social welfare is then Wsym = 12 p̄
2 ∑
i∈I
aibi
ai+bi
, and (20) then comes
from Proposition 1. The law of large numbers gives (21).
As f : x, y 	→ 11
x +
1
y
is strictly concave, Jensen’s inequality implies that Wopt ≥
Wsym, and that equality stands if and only if a, b are deterministic, i.e. identical
for every user.
4 Performance of Pricing Mechanisms
In this section, we study the influence of introducing a specific pricing scheme
for incentivizing users to offer storage capacity, and preventing them from using
more capacity than what is available. We consider a simple mechanism: con-
tributors are paid po per unit of storage capacity they offer to the system, and
service users are charged a unit price ps when they store their data onto the
2 Actually, the utility maximization problem for a user is a convex problem, that has
the same form as the social welfare maximization problem studied in subsection 2.2,
except that there are only two decisions variables (Coi and Csi ) here.
system. Such a mechanism offers users the choice to act as a pure consumer, as
a pure service provider, or to both contribute to and benefit from the service.
Remark that we will not try here to avoid the presence of a central authority or
clearance service: as the model aims to give hints for a commercial application,
it is reasonnable to consider the existence of such an entity.
The amount that user i will be charged (this amount can be negative, in which
case the user gets paid) is consequently
πi = psCsi − poCoi . (22)
We analyze the model as a full information game, i.e. we assume that the
entity that operates the service (the operator) has perfect knowledge of the
users and their valuation and cost functions. Therefore, knowing that users will
act so as to maximize their utility, it can predict user reactions, and drive the
outcome of the game to the most profitable situation for itself. In this sense, the
operator acts as the leader of a Stackelberg (or leader-follower) game [2]. We
investigate two possibilities: either the coordinator aims at maximizing the user
surplus, or it is a revenue-driven monopoly that chooses prices so as to maximize
its revenue. In both cases, the feasibility constraint (12) must be satisfied.
Welfare-Maximizing Operator. From our study in subsection 2.2, the the-
oretically highest level of social welfare can be attained by a payment based
scheme. In fact it is reached when the selling and buying prices are the same
and equal p∗ (see (14)). In that case the operator monetary surplus is null: the
operator has no income at all and just acts as a coordinator that redistributes
money among users.
Profit-Oriented Monopoly. In this subsection, we assume that the monopoly
strives to extract the maximum profit out of the business. The operator therefore
faces the following maximization problem.
max
ps,po
(
ps
∑
i
di (ps) − po
∑
i
si (po)
)
, (23)
subject to ps ≥ 0, po ≥ 0 and the constraint (12) that writes
∑
i si(p
o) ≥∑
i di(p
s).
This problem is hard to solve for general utility functions, and even under
Assumption A since it is not a convex problem. We therefore consider the case
where Assumption B holds.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions A and B the performance ratio of the social
welfare for a profit-maximizing monopoly Wmon to the maximum social welfare
W ∗ is
Wmon
W ∗
=
3
4
. (24)
Proof. Under Assumptions A and B, the profit maximization problem becomes
a convex problem that can be solved using the Lagrange method for example.
However here a simple graphical argument is enough to conclude.
Figure 1 plots two curves: the total demand D =
∑
i di and total supply
S =
∑
i si as functions of the unit price p. First remark that p
o and ps must be
chosen such that S(po) = D(ps): otherwise it is always possible for the operator
to decrease po (if S(po) > D(ps)) or increase ps (if S(po) < D(ps)) to strictly
improve its revenue. The operator revenue with such prices is then the area of
the rectangle displayed in Figure 1, embedded within a triangle whose area is the
maximum value of social welfare. The area of the rectangle is maximum when
S(po) = D(ps) = Q∗/2 with Q∗ = Dp∗ and p∗ is given in (14). In that case the
operator’s profit is W ∗/2, and the total social welfare is 3W ∗/4.
ppo p∗ ps
unit price
p̄
Monopoly profit
User surplus with monopoly pricing
S(
p)
=
∑ i
s i(
p)
D(p) =
∑
i d
i (p)Q∗/2
qu
an
tit
ie
s
Maximal Social Welfare W ∗
Q∗
Fig. 1. Maximal social welfare, and optimal choices for a revenue-driven monopoly
under Assumptions A and B
5 Does Imposed Symmetry Outperform Monopoly
Pricing?
In this section, we compare the two incentive schemes introduced so far in terms
of the underlying social welfare at equilibrium. Our point here is not to give
necessary and sufficient conditions for one of the two mechanism to provide a
larger social welfare than the other for general valuation and cost functions,
since the problem becomes much more difficult when Assumptions A and B are
relaxed (in particular some optimization problems like revenue maximization
are nonconvex and may exhibit local optima). We rather concentrate on our
simplifying assumptions and use some examples to highlight situations where
one scheme or the other can be better for the overall system.
The following result is a direct consequence of Propositions 2 and 3:
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions A, B, and C, and for a large number of
users, symmetric schemes outperform monopoly pricing if and only if
(
1
E[a]
+
1
E[b]
E
[
1
1
a +
1
b
≥ 3
4
. (25)
Proposition 4 highlights in particular the fact that if the population is homo-
geneous (i.e., a and b are Dirac distributions) then it is better to implement a
scheme based on symmetry, since the maximal social welfare can be attained
(from Jensen’s equality case). On the contrary, user heterogeneity in terms of a
and b will make the left-hand side of (25) decrease. If heterogeneity is too im-
portant then the left-hand side of (25) may take values below 3/4, which implies
that the system (users+coordinator) is better off being driven by a revenue-
maximizing monopoly.
At this point of the analysis the distribution of a and b turns out to be the
main characteristics of the game. Indeed, these parameters characterize the pro-
file of each user, i.e. her utility and cost functions, and her associated demand
and supply functions (di(p), si(p)). In the following we consider two simple ex-
amples of distributions (e.g., uniform and exponential) for a and b to illustrate
Proposition 4.
Uniform Distribution. We assume here that a (resp. b) is uniformly dis-
tributed over [0, amax] (resp. [0, bmax]). In that case we have E[a] = amax2 , E[b] =
bmax
2 , and
E
[
1
1
a +
1
b
=
1
3
(
amax + bmax −
a2max
bmax
ln(1 +
bmax
amax
) − b
2
max
amax
ln(1 +
amax
bmax
) .
(26)
The left-hand side of (25) and the plane z = 3/4 are displayed on Figure 2
(left). We observe that inequality (25) always holds, thus it is always better for
the system to impose symmetry than to introduce a profit-maximizing monopoly.
Exponential Distribution. We now consider the case where a (resp. b) follows
an exponential distributions with parameter μa (resp. μb). Therefore E[a] = 1μa ,
E[b] = 1μb , and after some calculation we obtain
E
[
1
1
a +
1
b
=
1
3μa
if μa = μb,
μ2a−μ2b−2μaμb ln( μaμb )
(μa−μb)3 otherwise.
(27)
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Fig. 2. Social welfare performance ratio of monopoly pricing (plane surfaces) and sym-
metric scheme (curved surfaces) as given by Propositions 2 and 3, for uniform (left)
and exponential (right) distributions of a and b
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Fig. 3. Best scheme (in the sense of social welfare) for exponential distributions of a
and b (μa and μb are the parameters of the exponential laws)
We again compare both terms of (25) on Figure 2 (right). This time, there is no
scheme that always outperforms the other: depending on how much the two vari-
ables differ, the monopoly can provide higher welfare than a symmetric scheme.
More precisely, when μa and μb are sufficiently close, then a revenue-maximizing
monopoly will drive the system to a situation where the social welfare is larger
than what a symmetry-based scheme would have yielded. Figure 5 indicates
the scheme that gives the best system welfare, depending on the values of μa
and μb.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed an economic model for a peer-to-peer backup
service. Assuming that users of such a service behave selfishly, we have justified
the need for incentive schemes for the system to effectively exist. We have studied
and compared two kinds of incentive schemes, namely a symmetry-based scheme
(users should contribute to the service as much as they use it) and a pricing-based
scheme (introduction of a monopoly that fixes unit prices for buying and selling
resource). Under some simplifying assumptions, we have highlighted conditions
for one scheme to outperform the other in terms of social welfare. Some examples
have shown that user heterogeneity plays a crucial role on the better-suited
scheme. Basically, it seems that more user heterogeneity would justify the use
of (even profit-driven) pricing.
There remains a lot of work to be done on this subject. First, we have made
quite restrictive assumptions on the form of the utility functions to derive some
results (we often used quadratic valuation and cost functions). It would be in-
teresting to obtain some results for more general cases. Moreover, we only con-
sidered that users had two decision variables, namely the quantity of data they
store into the system and the amount of storing capacity they offer. We are
currently working toward an extension of the model where users can also choose
the proportion of time they are online (a larger availability improves the service
offered to the others, but increases the perceived cost of the user), that also
needs an incentive scheme.
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